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LOCAL GOVERNMENT REDISTRICTING IN NEW
YORK: WHERE DOES THE POWER REPOSE?1
Henry Mark Holzer2 and Steven Barshov3
IL INTRODUCTION
The completion of the 1990 federal census signals the onset
of the decennial political bloodletting officially known as legisla-
tive redistricting, but more cynically referred to as gerrymander-
ing. Given the significant political stakes involved in the redraw-
ing of legislative election district lines, it is not surprising that
those persons and entities who believe themselves aggrieved 4
often turn to the courts to invalidate redistricting plans.0
Most plaintiffs generally attack redistricting "substantively"
by alleging that the new legislative districts violate "one person,
one vote,"' the Federal Voting Rights Act of 1965,7 and the re-
quirements of convenience, compactness and contiguity.8 Ironi-
I This article analyzes issues raised by and decided in Mehiel v. County of
Westchester, 175 A.D.2d 109, 571 N.Y.S.2d 808 (2d Dep't), appeal denied, 78 N.Y.2d
855, 573 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1991), in which the authors successfully defended Westchester
County's redistricting of the county legislature against a challenge that the new districts
could not be implemented until approved at a countywide referendum. Citations to the
Mehiel plaintiffs' appellate brief are to the "Respondents' Brief" and citations to
Westchester County's appellate brief are to "Appellants' Brief."
I Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
3 Counsel to the New York firm of Sive, Paget & Riesel, P.C.
" For example, the two lead plaintiffs in Mehiel were Dennis Mehiel, the chair of
the Westchester County Democratic Committee, and Sandra Galef, the Democratic mi-
nority leader of the county legislature. Respondents' Brief at 9. Furthermore the Mehiel
plaintiffs explicitly stated that they viewed the redistricting as purely politically moti-
vated for the sole purpose of retaining Republican control of the county legislature. Id.
at 7-9.
5 Westchester County is an appropriate example. No less than four separate law-
suits have been filed challenging the 1991 redistricting of the county legislature. See note
12 infra.
6 See, e.g., Abate v. Mundt, 403 U.S. 182, 183, (1971); Avery v. Midland County,
Tex., 390 U.S. 474, 475-76, (1968); Fortson v. Morris, 385 U.S. 231 (1966), reh'g denied,
385 U.S. 1021 (1967); Seaman v. Fedourich, 16 N.Y.2d 94, 209 N.E.2d 778, 262 N.Y.S.2d
444 (1965).
42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988).
'For example, the Westchester County Charter provides that a local law redistrict-
ing the county legislature: "shall comply with the legal requirements for equal represen-
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cally, because substantive redistricting litigation usually turns
on the specific facts of the new districting plan-for instance, is
there impermissible dilution of voting power, are minorities dis-
enfranchised, is a district "compact"?-important precedent is
not often generated. However, when a "procedural" redistricting
case calls into question the very source and nature of local gov-
ernment redistricting powers, affecting the state constitution's
"vertical" separation of powers between the people and their
elected representatives, very important precedent is set indeed.
In the New York Constitution the people retain the power
to approve changes to the most fundamental aspects of county
government, while elected representatives are allowed to exercise
less fundamental powers. For example, in article 9, section
1(h)(2), a permissive referendum10 is guaranteed whenever there
is a change proposed to the "form or composition of the county
legislative body." As redistricting is not mentioned explicitly in
this provision, the constitutional question must inevitably be
confronted: Does redistricting constitute a change in "form or
composition" of a legislative body? If so, the ultimate power to
rerdistrict reposes with the people. If not, the ultimate power
reposes with the legislature.
This issue was recently raised in Mehiel v. County of West-
chester, where the redistricting of the Westchester County Leg-
islature was attacked for failure to submit the redistricting plan,
enacted as Local Law 8-1991,11 to a countywide referendum
before implementing the new county legislative districts for the
November 1991 primary and general elections. While other sub-
sequently filed lawsuits have challenged the substance of the
tation and representation areas prescribed in such local law [shall] be of convenient and
contiguous territory in as compact a form as practicable." WESTCHESTER COUNTY, N.Y.,
CHARTER § 107.31(6) (1990) (COUNTY CHARTER).
' "Vertical" is used to describe separation of powers between groups that are not
coequal, such as between the people and their elected representatives. "Horizontal" de-
scribes separation of powers among the coequal legislative, executive and judicial
branches of the same government.
10 To have a "permissive" referendum, the people in the area in question must first
file a petition calling for the referendum. Generally there is a statute or constitutional
provision that prescribes the number of petition signatures required, the time within
which such signatures can be gathered and filed, the persons eligible to sign, etc. N.Y.
MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 24 (Consol. 1977). A referendum is said to be "mandatory"
when a state statute or constitutional provision requires a referendum as a condition
precedent to the effectiveness of a given legislative action. Id. § 23.
" See note 75 and accompanying text infra.
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particular redistricting plan adopted by the county,1 2 the Mehiel
procedural challenge attacked the underlying power of a charter
county3 to redistrict without a referendum.
Indeed, not only did the Mehiel plaintiffs seek to invoke the
permissive referendum guarantee of the state constitution, 4 but
also to force Westchester and all other charter counties to con-
form to the same rules of redistricting imposed by the state
upon noncharter counties, to wit: no redistricting plan could be
implemented without subjecting the redistricting local law to
referendum procedures mandated by the Municipal Home Rule
Law (MIHRL).1 5 The plaintiffs also argued that a change in legis-
12 Town of Scarsdale v. County of Westchester, No. 91-11877, slip op. (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Westchester County Mar. 27, 1992) (alleging that the redistricting was illegal because it
split the Town of Scarsdale into two county legislative districts); Paulin v. County of
Westchester, No. 91-11288 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Westchester County Oct. 10, 1991) (decision
and order allowing intervention in Town of Scarsdale and dismissing action); Chonigman
v. County of Westchester, No. 91-9214 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Westchester County filed 1991)
(alleging that the redistricting violated one person, one vote and failed to create districts
which were contiguous, convenient, and as compact as practicable).
13 A charter county is a county whose fundamental powers and form of government
are established in a charter adopted either by special state statute or by local law under
the County Charter Law. The County Charter Law is a state statute that authorizes
counties to adopt a local charter establishing a county's fundamental governmental or-
ganization and powers. The County Charter Law is codified as part of the Municipal
Home Rule Law. N.Y. MuN. Hohm RuLE LAW §§ 30-35 (Consol. 1977).
The Municipal Home Rule Law is a statute that, along with the Statute of Local
Governments, implements local government home rule powers granted in article 9 of the
N.Y. Constitution. The principle of home rule is that local governments are empowered
to exercise local control over local affairs. The permissible limits of such local control are
determined by the provisions of the state constitution, the Municipal Home Rule Law,
and the Statute of Local Governments. A county seeking to maximize its home rule pow-
ers would ordinarily adopt a charter as authorized in the County Charter Law. A county
charter is a local law approved by the county voters or a special law adopted by request
of a county which establishes the basic form of governmental structure and the powers of
the county. A county operating under a charter maintains control over the form and
structure of its government through charter revision powers granted in the County Char-
ter Law.
A noncharter county is a county whose powers and form of government are estab-
lished by applicable provisions of the County Law. See N.Y. CouTrV LAW §§ 1-1003
(Consol. 1977). The County Law and the County Charter Law are different statutes and
are codified separately. Many counties have elected to remain organized under the
County Law because it is adequate to meet their needs. Typically, rural counties or
counties with smaller populations have found that they possess adequate powers and an
appropriate governmental organization as authorized in the state statutes and conse-
quently have not seen fit to adopt a local charter.
14 N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(h)(2); note 25 infra.
11 The Municipal Home Rule Law (MHRL) is a comprehensive statute that governs
the most basic affairs of counties, cities, towns and villages throughout the state. It must
1992]
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lative district boundaries constitutes, as a matter of law, a
change in the form or composition of the local elected legislature
guaranteeing at least a permissive referendum under the New
York Constitution l" and the County Charter Law17 and a
mandatory referendum under the Westchester County Adminis-
trative Code (County Code)."8 In effect, the plaintiffs were argu-
ing that even the movement of only one boundary line a dis-
tance of only one block would constitute a change in the local
elected legislature's form or composition, thereby triggering ref-
erendum procedures and transferring the power to redistrict
from the political branches to the people. The underlying con-
ceptual thrust of the plaintiffs' case was that the power to redis-
trict did not repose ultimately with the Westchester County gov-
ernment but with the people.
The Mehiel plaintiffs relied heavily on MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13)(e), which they argued guaranteed at least the op-
portunity for the county's qualified electors to file a petition re-
questing that a referendum be held on the redistricting plan.
Among other things, they contended that the MHRL preempted
and superseded any independent source of power under which
Westchester County might redistrict, such as the Westchester
County Charter (County Charter) or the County Code.
These procedural attacks on the county's redistricting au-
thority struck at the very heart of local government home rule"9
powers. Few powers are more fundamental to home rule than
be read in conjunction with Article 9 of the New York Constitution, the N.Y. County
Law, the N.Y. General City Law, the N.Y. General Municipal Law, the N.Y. Town Law,
the N.Y. Village Law and the N.Y. Statute of Local Governments, which together com-
prise the fundamental grants to and limitations upon the powers of local governments.
An example of the grant of powers in the MHRL is the County Charter Law which
authorizes counties to adopt and amend local county charters. See note 13 supra. An
example of the limitation of powers in the MHRL is the referendum requirement im-
posed upon any redistricting legislation enacted by noncharter counties. N.Y. MUN.
HOME RULE LAW § 30. In Mehiel the plaintiffs sought to impose upon charter counties
the referendum limitation imposed by the MHRL on noncharter counties.
:6 See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(h)(2); note 25 infra.
17 See N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 34(4) (Consol. 1977).
"S See WESTCHESTR COUNTY, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 209.161 (1990) (CouNTY CODE).
'9 Home rule is generally considered the power of local governments to control their
own affairs. In New York, home rule is granted to units of local government prindipally
for the purpose of authorizing local control over matters falling within the property, af-
fairs and government of local government. See N.Y. CONST. art. IX; N.Y. MuN. HOME
RULE LAW (Consol. 1977); N.Y. STAT. LOCAL Gov'Ts §§ 10-13, 20 (Consol. 1984).
[Vol. 57: 1049
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the power to determine local legislative district boundaries for a
locally elected legislative body under local charter provisions. In
fact, for many years the New York Court of Appeals has explic-
itly held that local government redistricting is a matter of local
concern falling within the "property, affairs or government" of
local governments.20
The concrete issues raised in Mehiel and addressed in this
article, which are of vital importance to all involved with local
government redistricting in New York, can be summarized as
follows:
1. Under what grant of authority do units of local govern-
ment redistrict?
2. Do the terms and provisions of the MHRL govern local
government redistricting and supersede local charter provisions?
3. Under what circumstances is a referendum required or
permitted as a prerequisite to implementing new legislative
districts?
4. Does redistricting constitute a change in the form or com-
position of a local elected legislative body?
The balance of this article is a full exploration of these is-
sues, beginning with a discussion of the underpinnings of the
Mehiel plaintiffs' procedural attack on the county's legislative
redistricting. Then, relevant aspects of the history and evolution
of local government organization and powers in New York are
analyzed to provide the background against which the Mehiel
plaintiffs' theories can be evaluated. Finally, the article details
the resolution of the Mehiel case and analyzes its impact on lo-
cal government redistricting powers generally.
II. Tim Mehiel PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS
A. Form or Composition
The Mehiel plaintiffs' most far-reaching argument was their
allegation that any redistricting constitutes, as a matter of law, a
change in the "form or composition" of a local elected legisla-
ture. If the plaintiffs were correct, no local government redis-
tricting in New York could be effective unless referendum proce-
dures were complied with prior to implementation of the
"0 See Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 173, 160 N.E.2d 443, 445, 189




The plaintiffs argued that the terms "change in form or
composition," "restructure," "recast," "reapportion," and "redis-
trict" were all used interchangeably by the state legislature in
article 9, section 1 of the New York Constitution and in the
MHRL. 22 Accordingly, they argued that any statute or other
provision of law which referred to a change in the form or com-
position of a legislative body was also intended to apply to redis-
tricting. They also relied on a number of cases in which the
courts had ordered a referendum on proposed redistricting
plans. 23 In two of these cases a referendum was required when
the only change proposed was a change in district boundaries, as
was the case in Mehiel. 24
Assuming they had proved that a change in the form or
composition of the local elected legislative body is synonymous
with redistricting, the Mehiel plaintiffs then focused on New
York Constitution, article 9, section 1(h)(2),25 section 34(4) of
2' See N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1(h)(2); N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW §34(4). Both the
state constitution and the MHRL delay the effective date of a local law purporting to
change a local legislature's form or composition in order to allow filing of a petition call-
ing for a referendum on the local law. See also N.Y. MuN. HOME RULE LAW § 23(2)(b)
(requires cities, towns and villages to hold a mandatory referendum if a local law
"changes the membership or composition of the legislative body or increases or decreases
the number of votes which 'any member is entitled to cast"). See also COUNTY CODE,
supra note 18, § 209.161 (imposes a mandatory election if the Westchester County Legis-
lature enacts a local law changing the form or composition of the county legislature).
22 Respondents' Brief at 26-27.
2 See Graham v. Board of Supervisors of Erie County, 25 A.D.2d 250, 269 N.Y.S.2d
477 (4th Dep't 1966); Trieber v. Lanigan, 25 A.D.2d 202, 269 N.Y.S.2d 595 (4th Dep't
1966); Village of North Syracuse v. County Legislature of Onondaga, 74 Misc. 2d 842,
346 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1973); Prentiss v. Cahill, 73 Misc. 2d 245,
341 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973).
24 See North Syracuse, 74 Misc. 2d at 844, 346 N.Y.S.2d at 441; Prentiss, 73 Misc.
2d at 249, 341 N.Y.S.2d at 747. However, neither of these cases was accepted by the
appellate division in Mehiel as viable precedent. Westchester County had criticized these
cases for not actually analyzing whether referenda were required, but rather merely as-
suming that referenda were necessary. See note 100 infra. Although the cases are not
mentioned at all in the appellate division's opinion in Mehiel, during oral argument Pre-
siding Justice Mangano did press counsel for the plaintiffs on this point and noted in his
questions that there was no reasoning in either North Syracuse or Prentiss to indicate
that the referendum issue was aggressively briefed or argued therein.
25 NY CONsT. art. IX, § 1(h)(2) provides: "After adoption of an alternative form of
county government by a county, any amendment thereof . . . by local law which . . .
changes the form or composition of the county legislative body shall be subject to a
permissive referendum as provided by the legislature."
[Vol. 57: 1049
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the MHRL,26 and section 209.161 of the County Code to support
their argument that a redistricting plan cannot be implemented
except in compliance with referenda procedures. They argued
that while article 9, section 1(h)(2) of the New York Constitu-
tion and section 34(4) of the MHRL require charter counties to
comply with a permissive referendum process as a prerequisite
to implementing a change in a county's form or composition, 7
the County Code imposes a greater restriction on the county by
requiring a mandatory referendum when a change in form or
composition occurs:
No local law shall become operative or effective unless and until the
same is adopted by the affirmative vote of a majority of the qualified
electors of the county... if it ... changes the form or composition
of the elective governing body of the county.18
There is no doubt that New York Constitution, article 9,
section 1(h)(2) and MHRL section 34(4) require that county
electors of charter counties be given an opportunity to petition
for a referendum on a proposed change in the form or composi-
tion of a county legislature and that Westchester County Code
section 209.161 requires a mandatory referendum on any local
law that proposes a change in the form or composition of the
Westchester County Legislature. Thus, if the Mehiel plaintiffs
were correct in arguing that redistricting is synonymous with a
change in form or composition, there would be no denying that a
referendum would be a prerequisite to implementing any redis-
tricting of the Westchester County Legislature.
28 This provision of the County Charter Law executes N.Y. CossT. art. IX, § 1(h)(2)
as follows:
[N]o charter law or local law, which ... changes the form or composition of
the board of supervisors of such county, shall become effective in such county
until at least sixty days after its final enactment. If... within such sixty da)s
electors of the county... in number equal to at least five per centum of the
total number of votes cast in the county for governor at the last gubernatorial
election, shall file a petition ... protesting against such law, charter law or
local law, it shall become effective in such county only if approved by the elec-
tors thereof at the next ensuing general election ....
N.Y. MUN. HomE RULE LAW § 34(4).
1 See notes 25 & 26 and accompanying text supra.
28 COUNTY CODE, supra note 18, § 209.161.
19921
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B. Referendum Theory Based Upon MHRL §10(1)(a)(13)
The Mehiel plaintiffs also argued that even if a mandatory
referendum were not required, compliance with the procedures
for a permissive referendum was still necessary.29 They noted
29 Alternatively, in an argument that was virtually ignored by the appellate division,
the Mehiel plaintiffs posited that even if a redistricting local law was not equivalent to a
change in the form or composition of the local legislature, MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e)
still required a mandatory referendum on Local Law 8-1991. As is relevant to the Mehiel
plaintiffs' claims, the MHRL provides that a county, city, town or village may engage in:
[t]he apportionment of its legislative body . . . . The power granted by this
subparagraph shall be in addition to and not in substitution for any other
power and the provisions of this subparagraph shall apply only to local govern-
ments which adopt a plan of apportionment thereunder ....
(e) A local law proposed to be adopted under this subparagraph shall be
subject to referendum only in the manner provided by paragraph j of subdivi-
sion two of section twenty-four of this chapter, except that such local law shall
be subject to a mandatory referendum in any county in which a provision of
law requires a mandatory referendum if a local law proposes a change in the
form or composition of the elective governing body of the county.
N.Y. MuN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(a)(13) (emphasis added).
.Relying upon the emphasized language of the statute, the Mehiel plaintiffs argued
that MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) forces a mandatory referendum on a redistricting lo.
cal law in any county in which a separate provision of law requires a mandatory referen-
dum on a local law proposing a change in the form or composition of the elective gov-
erning body of the county. In other words, the Mehiel plaintiffs argued that a local law
merely changing district boundary lines for a county legislature would be subject to a
mandatory referendum, even if it did not itself change the form or composition of the
County's legislature, so long as another provision of law would require the county to
conduct a mandatory referendum on a local law that might be proposed to change the
form or composition of the county legislature.
By linking MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) to section 209.161 of the County Code, the
Mehiel plaintiffs contended that a local law redistricting the county's legislature would
be subject to a mandatory referendum because the County Code contains a provision of
law which "requires a mandatory referendum if a local law proposes a change in the form
or composition of the elective governing body of the county." Thus, under the Mehiel
plaintiffs' theory, the presence of section 209.161 in the County Code triggers the
mandatory referendum requirement of MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) every time that the
County redistricts.
However, the county did not redistrict pursuant to MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) be-
cause it redistricted pursuant to its charter. Sub-subparagraph (e) is irrelevant to and
wholly inapplicable to charter counties that redistrict pursuant to a grant of power in
their charters because (e) by its express terms applies only to: "A local law proposed to
be adopted under this subparagraph . . ." § 10(1)(a)(13)(e).
The quoted clause expressly establishes that both the permissive and mandatory
referendum requirements in sub-subparagraph (e) are applicable only to a redistricting
local law adopted under MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) and not to a redistricting local law
adopted under a local charter.
On appeal, Westchester County argued that the trial court erroneously "linked" see-
(Vol. 57:1049
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that MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) provides that a redistricting
local law shall be subject to referendum as "provided by para-
graph j of subdivision two of section twenty-four of this chap-
ter." MHRL section 24(2)(j) establishes a permissive referendum
process consisting of two alternatives. The local government's
legislative body can call for a referendum on its own, or at least
five percent of the qualified voters who voted for governor at the
last gubernatorial election can file a petition calling for a refer-
endum on the proposed redistricting." Under such a process, the
effective date of Local Law 8-1991 would be delayed until the
statutory period for filing a petition demanding a referendum
had expired. 31
The key assumption underlying all of the MHRL-based at-
tacks on Local Law 8-1991 was that the state legislature had en-
acted MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) to supersede any charter pow-
ers that the county may have had to enact redistricting without
prior referendum, permissive or mandatory. In Mehiel the court
was forced to determine whether the state had usurped the re-
districting power of charter counties. This issue prompts a more
fundamental constitutional question, where does the power to
redistrict repose-with the people or with their elected repre-
sentatives? To reach the answer to both issues it is necessary to
review the historical circumstances that culminated in the adop-
tion of MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) and thereby ascertain the ac-
tual intent of the state legislature and the framers of the state
tion 209.161 of the County Code to M1HRL section 10(1)(a)(13) to create a "preemption"
of the County's redistricting powers as granted in its charter. As MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13) does not apply at all to a charter county, it cannot be "linked to" or "trig-
gered by" any provision of the County Code or Charter nor can it preempt a local char-
ter's grant of redistricting power. For the trial court's treatment of the plaintiffs argu-
ment, see note 79 infra.
SO N.Y. MUN. Holm RULE LAW §24(2)(j).
11 As a practical matter, such a delay would have prevented the use of the new dis-
trict boundaries for the 1991 elections, even if no petition requesting a referendum had
been filed. Thus, the Mehiel plaintiffs did not need a court ordered referendum to pre-
vent use of the new lines in the 1991 elections. All they needed was a judicial opinion
that the cross reference to MHRL § 24(2)0) in ?MHRL § 10(1)(a)(13)(e) required the
county to comply with the permissive referendum procedures of § 24(2)j). This would
have accomplished their most immediate political goal of delaying elections under any
new districts until 1993. Given that Local Law 8-1991 was enacted by a 9 to 8 vote which
was virtually along party lines, the Democrats hoped that the 1991 elections would
change the membership of the county legislature, possibly enabling proponents of a dif-
ferent districting plan to be in the majority. This new majority could then repeal Local




III. EVOLUTION OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT'S HOME RULE POWERS
OVER FORM OF GOVERNMENT AND REDISTRICTING
A. Typical County's Supervisorial Form of Government32
Historically, New York noncharter counties had a superviso-
rial form of government. Under this form of government a
county's legislature was a board of supervisors composed of town
and city supervisors.33 Town and city supervisors would also
serve in the county legislature by virtue of their holding town or
city elective office. 4 In this system, the various town and city
elected officials represented the territorial unit of the county
from which they were elected. For example, before a judicially
mandated change in the form and composition of the county
board of supervisors in the 1960s, the Onondaga County Board
of Supervisors was composed of supervisors elected from each of
the nineteen towns of the county and each of the nineteen
wards35 of the city of Syracuse." There was no requirement that
each member of the board of supervisors represent a substan-
tially equal number of people.
This form of government was summarized by the New York
Attorney General:
[N]on-charter counties had a legislative body consisting of the town
supervisor from each town regardless of its population. (If there was a
city within a county, the city charter provided for supervisors to be
elected to sit on the county board of supervisors.) This was the long-
3 The following discussion of a typical county's form of government is important
for historical purposes. Today the requirement of "one person, one vote" often precludes
the supervisoriul form of county government as it traditionally existed in New York.
" Town Law § 20 provides that each town has one supervisor and one or more
councilors depending on its size. Town Law § 41 allows certain towns to have more than
one supervisor. See N.Y. TOWN LAW §§ 20, 41 (Consol. 1987 & Supp. 1992). The office of
city supervisor was provided either in a city's charter or in a state statute. For example,
Second Class Cities Law § 11 provides that one city supervisor shall be elected from each
ward of the city. N.Y. SECOND CLASS CITIES LAW § 11 (Consol. 1952).
" County Law § 150 provides that the county board of supervisors be composed of
elected town and city supervisors. Town Law § 29(14) provides that town supervisors
shall serve on the county board of supervisors. Second Class Cities Law § 210 provides
that city supervisors shall perform the same duties as town supervisors.
" For purposes of this article, the terms "ward" and "district" are synonymous.
36 See Barzelay v. Board of Supervisors of Onondaga County, 47 Misc. 2d 1013,
1014, 263 N.Y.S.2d 854, 856 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1965).
[Vol. 57:1049
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established form of government for counties.37
In this system, noncharter counties were empowered to de-
termine the number of supervisors that would coinprise the
county board of supervisors. In theory the county could deter-
mine the number of supervisors to be allocated to each city.
However, counties were not allowed to alter the bounda.ries of
the city wards from which the local supervisors were elected.
Rather, the power to draw district lines was retained by the cit-
ies. This curious split of powers has been well documented in
the courts:
[A]lIthough the defendant Common Council of the City of Syracuse
has no power to fix the number of [county] supervisors to be chosen
by the electors of the City of Syracuse, it is, in fact, required to set the
boundaries of the wards from which those supervisors from the City of
Syracuse are elected."
Thus, even if a noncharter county desired to change the
form and composition of the board of supervisors, it could not
do so because it lacked the power to implement the new form
and composition of the legislative body. In other words, even if a
county could in theory change its county legislature so that its
members would be persons directly elected solely to serve on the
county legislature from districts of substantially equal popula-
tion, the county had no power to put such a system into effect
because it had no power to draw ward or district boundary
lines.39
While the state legislature enacted a very limited authoriza-
tion in the mid-1930s for noncharter counties to choose between
two alternative forms of government, most counties desiring
greater home rule and more local control over the county's form
of government sought adoption of a county charter by special
law of the state legislature. °
37 1981 N.Y. Op. Att'y Gen. 254, 256 (Informal).
Barzelay, 47 Misc. 2d at 1015, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 857.
39 See Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 160 N.E.2d 443, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129
(1959); Barzelay, 47 Misc. 2d at 1013, 263 N.Y.S.2d at 854; Brairton v. Gillette, 40 Misc.
2d 1009, 244 N.Y.S.2d 513 (Sup. Ct. Monroe County 1963), affd, 23 A.D.2d 537, 255
N.Y.S.2d 831 (4th Dep't 1965); Neils v. Yonkers, 38 Misc. 2d 691, 237 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County 1962).
"I Before the mid-1930s, counties had no general powers to alter their form of gov-
ernment. In 1935, counties were granted limited power to alter their form of government
under the Fearon Amendment to the New York Constitution, article III, section 26 (re-
1992]
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B. Westchester County Charter
As was typical of counties seeking true home rule in the
mid-1930s, Westchester County obtained a special state grant of
power with the enactment of the Westchester County Charter in
1937.41 In the County Charter the state legislature conferred full
home rule powers on the county by authorizing the county legis-
lature to "exercise all powers of local legislation and administra-
tion as provided, in section twenty-six of article three of the con-
stitution of the state of New York." 2 and by affirmatively
stating that among the other extensive powers granted to the
county were "all the rights, privileges, functions, powers, duties
and obligations conferred or imposed on it by general or special
law, not inconsistent with or in limitation of the provisions of
this act. . .[and] all other powers necessary or proper for carry-
ing into execution any of the powers specifically conferred uponit.,,4s
As was typical in such legislation, the state legislature also
temporarily established the county's form of government. The
pealed). The Fearon Amendment, 1935 N.Y. Laws 1833, authorized counties to choose
from two alternative plans of government. However, to execute a change to an alterna-
tive form of government, the law required "split referenda" in which multiple geographic
areas of a county were required to approve the plan separately. See Comment, County
Home Rule: Freedom from Legislative Interference, 8 BUFFALO L. REV. 252 (1959). Ac-
cordingly, only one county availed itself of this cumbersome process. See Cort v. Smith,
249 A.D. 1, 291 N.Y.S. 54 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 273 N.Y. 481, 6 N.E.2d 414 (1936). Due to
this cumbersome process, a county charter was the only realistic means of attaining
greater local control over the county's form of government.
" See Act of May 25, 1937, ch. 617, 1937 N.Y. Laws 1371 (codified at COUNTY CHIAR-
TER, supra note 8, arts. I-XIX).
42 Id. §7(2), 1937 N.Y. Laws at 1319. The same provision is presently codified in the
COUNTY CHARTER, supra note 8, § 107.21.
43 Id. §3, 1937 N.Y. Laws at 1318. The same provision is currently codified in the
COUNTY CHARTER, supra note 8, § 104.11(1).
The state legislature included additional language in the County Charter granting
unenumerated powers-akin to the federal Constitution's unenumerated rights grant
found in the Ninth Amendment-making it clear beyond doubt that local home rule was
real and that the county did indeed possess all of the powers necessary for it to discharge
its myriad political and other functions:
The enumeration of particular powers by this act shall not be deemed to be
exclusive, but in addition to the powers enumerated or implied herein or ap-
propriate to the exercise of such powers, the county shall have and may exer-
cise all powers which under the Constitution of the State of New York it would
be competent for this act specifically to enumerate, and all powers necessarily
incident or fairly to be implied, not inconsistent with the provisions hereof.
COUNTY CHARTER, supra, note 8, § 104.21(1).
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County Charter provided that the county legislature would con-
sist of the board of supervisors composed of elected city and
town supervisors-the same system Westchester County had
before the enactment of the County Charter."
However, the intent of the state legislature was to empower
the county to change its form of government. As the county had
no power under the general laws of the state to change its own
form of government, the County Charter also included a specific
grant of power enabling the county to change the form and com-
position of its governing body. Specifically, the charter author-
ized a switch from the board of supervisors to a county legisla-
ture composed of not less than ten members or mnore than twelve
members who would be directly elected from districts to be cre-
ated by the county legislature and to be based primarily upon
population equality.45 Such a change in the form and composi-
tion of the county legislative body could not be undertaken un-
less the change was approved by the county's voters at a
referendum.
The state legislature expressly granted the following power
to the county legislature, which would be utilized if the form
and composition of the county legislature were ever changed to a
system of directly elected legislators representing districts:
"Members of the county board shall be known as county legisla-
tors and shall be elected at large from the districts fixed by the
board of supervisors."46
These provisions of the Charter are of more than mere pass-
ing historical interest. In fact, in 1941 a referendum was held
under the County Charter as it then existed in which the voters
rejected the switch in the form and composition of the county
legislature.4 7 Thus, the supervisorial form of government re-
" Ch. 617, § 5, 1937 N.Y. Laws at 1318.
, Id. § 8, 1937 N.Y. Laws at 1320.
46 Id. § 8(3), 1937 N.Y. Laws at 1321.
4 Id. §§ 5, 8. Decades later the supervisorial system retained by the county's voters
was challenged as a violation of the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote. In
the course of upholding the challenge, the Supreme Court of Westchester County noted
that the county electorate could have switched their form of government to one in which
county legislators were directly elected from districts of equal population:
[The referendum] was never again submitted, but it deserves mention as evi-
dence of the fact that long before any reapportionment of the county legisla-
tive body was mandated on constitutional grounds, the feasibility of replacing
the city and town supervisors with a smaller body chosen by districts was spe-
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mained in effect until it was eventually held to violate the prin-
ciple of one person, one vote. 8
C. Westchester County Code
After the enactment of the Westchester County Charter the
state legislature subsequently enacted another special law in or-
der to create the County Code.49 In the County Code, the state
legislature reiterated the strong grant of home rule powers to
Westchester County:
It is the intention of the legislature by this title to provide for carry-
ing into effect the provisions of article nine of the constitution pursu-
ant to the direction contained therein and hereby to enable Westches-
.ter county to adopt and amend local laws for the purpose of fully and
completely exercising the powers granted to counties by the terms and
spirit of such article."
In addition, similar to the County Charter's required refer-
endum to approve a switch in the form and composition of the
county legislature from a board of supervisors to a board of
county officials elected from single member districts, the state
legislature expanded this requirement in the County Code by re-
cifically contemplated.
Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Supervisors of Westchester County, 59 Misc. 2d 152,
154, 298 N.Y.S.2d 615, 618 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County), af'd, 32 A.D.2d 892, 302
N.Y.S.2d 970 (2d Dep't), af'd, 25 N.Y.2d 817, 303 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1969).
'8 See Greenburgh, 49 Misc. 2d 116, 266 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1966). As of 1966 the Westchester Board of Supervisors had one supervisor each from
the towns of Greenburgh and North Salem, two supervisors from the city of Peekskill,
four supervisors from New Rochelle, five from Mount Vernon, three from White Plains,
and twelve from the city of Yonkers. Id. at 117, 266 N.Y.S.2d at 1001.
" Act of Apr. 6, 1948, ch. 852, 1948 N.Y. Laws 1542 (codified at COUNTY CODE,
supra note 18).
" Id. § 42, 1948 N.Y. Laws at 1556 (codified at COUNTY CODE, supra note 18, §
209.221. To implement this intention, the state legislature added the express admonition
that: "This title shall be construed liberally. The powers herein granted shall be in addi-
tion to all other powers granted to the county by other provisions of law." Id. § 43, 1948
N.Y. Laws, at 1556 (emphasis added) (codified at COUNTY CODE, supra note 18, §
209.231).
In addition, the state legislature expressly stated that beyond each and every one of
the broad powers it had already specifically granted to Westchester County, the county
possessed still further powers even though no one had yet thought of exactly what those
powers were: "The enumeration of specific powers by this title shall not operate to re-
strict the meaning of a general grant of power given by statute or otherwise, or to ex-
clude other powers comprehended in such general grant." Id. § 44, 1948 N.Y. Laws at
1556 (codified at COUNTY CODE, supra note 18, § 209.241).
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quiring that any change in the "form or composition" of the
county legislature be subject to a mandatory referendum., 1
From this review of the Westchester County Charter and
Code certain historical facts are evident:
1) the County Charter and Code conferred broad home rule
powers on the county by direct grant of the state legislature;
2) the County Charter and Code authorized a switch in the
form and composition of the county legislature from a board of
supervisors composed of town and city officials to a board com-
posed of county officials directly elected from districts of sub-
stantially equal population;
3) in the event of such a switch, the County Charter granted
the power to the county legislature to redistrict itself;
4) in 1941 the voters opted to retain the supervisorial sys-
tem; and
5) the supervisorial system was eventually held to violate
the constitutional mandate of one person, one vote.
Critical to the placement of these events in the context of
the evolution of local government powers in New York is the
fact that all of the powers granted to Westchester County in its
Code and Charter were the product of special legislation. In the
absence of special legislation creating a county charter and code,
counties had no general power to adopt and revise their own
charters.2
D. Expansion of County Home Rule Powers
In 1959 the state legislature finally adopted the County
Charter Law and cured New York's long-standing failure to
grant broad charter creation and revision authority to New York
counties by general law. 3 In the County Charter Law, counties
were empowered to adopt or amend charters to "set forth the
structure of the county government" in the county charter."
Westchester County was given the power to amend its charter,
"1 See id. § 36, 1948 N.Y. Laws at 1554, (codified at CouNTY CODE, supra note 18, §
209.161).
52 See note 40 supra.
See Act of Apr. 20, 1959, ch. 569, 1959 N.Y. Laws 1400 (codified at N.Y. COUNTY
LAW §§ 320-25) as amended by Act of Apr. 9, 1962, chs. 367 & 403, 1962 N.Y. Lans 2161,
2219 (amending N.Y. CouNTY LAW §§ 324(4) & 323(1)). The County Charter Law was
carried forward into the MHRL in 1963. See N.Y. MuN. Ho.,E RULE LAW §§ 30-35.
" See N.Y. MUN. Hobm RULE LAW § 33(2).
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as previously enacted by special state law, because the term
"county charter" was defined to include a charter established
"by act of the legislature.''55
While this expansion of home rule powers for counties aided
counties with charters, it did not in any way expand the powers
of noncharter counties to change the form or composition of
their county legislature-a matter of critical importance in light
of the county government upheavals that would soon follow in
the 1960s.5
E. The 1963 Home Rule "Package"
The enactment of the County Charter Law was followed a
few years later by a comprehensive set of constitutional and leg-
islative enactments designed to expand home rule powers for lo-
cal governments generally, 57 to create a new Statute of Local
Governments, 58 and to overhaul the multiple statutes governing
local government home rule by creating a new composite stat-
ute-the Municipal Home Rule Law (MHRL).
In generating these new state statutes, the state legislature
did not place any restrictions on the power of any county, char-
ter or noncharter, to redistrict. In this regard it is critical to note
that MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) was not included in the 1963
home rule package of constitutional and statutory amendments.
Rather, this provision was added to the MHRL six years later,
in 1969, in response to the intervening revolution of the law of
voting rights during the 1960s. As will be demonstrated, MHRL
section 10(1)(a)(13) was enacted to grant additional powers to
noncharter counties in order to enable them to comply with one
person, one vote and not to restrict the existing powers of New
York's charter counties.
" Id. § 32(4).
80 See notes 59-75 and accompanying text infra.
'T The very first section of the Constitution's new article 9, adopted November 6,
1963, not by the legislature but by the people themselves, contained a new "Bill of
Rights" for local governments. N.Y. CONST. art. IX, § 1.
" See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
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IV. ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE AND ITS IMPACT ON COUNTY
GOVERNMENT
A. One Person, One Vote
During the 1960s, the Supreme Court firmly established the
principle of "one person, one vote" and applied it to units of
local government."9 As a result a number of counties in New
York were sued,60 including Westchester County.01 In those
cases the typical .county board of supervisors was struck down
because city and town supervisors represented "territory" for
purposes of their membership on the county board rather than
election districts of substantially equal population.2
Unfortunately, as a matter of state law, New York's non-
charter counties were on the horns of a dilemma. On the one
hand, they had to comply with "one person, one vote," but on
the other they had no way to implement a switch in the form
and composition of their county legislatures from supervisors
elected from towns and cities to county legislators elected from
districts. The source of the obstacle was the inability of non-
charter counties to redraw district boundaries, as this power was
vested solely with the town and city governments.05
B. Adoption of MHRL Section 10(1)(a)(13)
To remedy the split in power between noncharter counties
and the towns and cities located within its borders, the state leg-
islature enacted MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13).6 ' The need for this
legislation was aptly summarized by the attorney general:
Clause 13 was added to the Municipal Home Rule Law in 1969 [be-
See note 6 supra.
Typical examples include Trieber v. Lanigan, 25 A.D.2d 202, 269 N.Y.S.2d 595
(4th Dep't. 1966), Barzelay v. Board of Supervisors of Onondaga County, 47 Misc. 2d
1013, 263 N.Y.S.2d 854 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1965).
61 See notes 67-70 and accompanying text infra.
62 Justice Nolan of the Westchester Supreme Court observed: "We have been told
by the Supreme Court that legislators represent people, not trees or acres, and are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests ...... Town of Greenburgh
v. Board of Supervisors of Westchester County, 49 Misc. 2d 116, 117, 266 N.Y.S.2d 998,
1000 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1966).
"See notes 33-40 and accompanying text supra.
" See Act of May 22, 1969, ch. 834, § 2, 1969 N.Y. Laws 1224, 1225-26 (amending
N.Y. MuN. Hos. RULE LAW §§ 10, 24); ch. 835, § 1, 1969 N.Y. Law's 1227, 1227-28
(amending N.Y. MuN. HouE RuLE LAW § 10).
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cause] prior to that addition, non-charter counties had had no statu-
tory authority to comply with the "one person one vote" rule enunci-
ated by the United States Supreme Court .... 65
The state legislature's express statement of its intent fully
supported the attorney general's reading of the act:
The requirement that constituencies of legislators must be substan-
tially equal in population, so as to prevent an impairment of the con-
stitutionally protected right to vote, as lately found and declared by
the federal judiciary, imposed upon many local governments the obli-
gation to make confirming adjustments in the structures of their legis-
lative bodies. . . . [E]xisting law in many cases, does not adequately
permit local governments to recast the structures of their legislative
bodies in a form which complies with the aforesaid requirements."
Accordingly, it is clear that MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) was
enacted to provide additional powers to noncharter counties and
was never intended to abrogate or limit independent grants of
power already possessed by home rule counties such as West-
chester. Specifically, MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) authorized non-
charter counties to redistrict and thereby implement a switch
from the supervisorial form of government to a directly elected
county legislature.
61 1981 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 255, 256 (Informal). The attorney general continued:
Non-charter counties had a legislative body consisting of the town supervisor
from each town regardless of its population. (If there was a city within a
county, the city charter provided for supervisors to be elected to sit on the
county board of supervisors.) This was the long-established form of govern-
ment for counties. Unlike cities and villages, counties were not chartered and
therefore did not have a tailored form of government. Beginning in the middle
of the 1930's, counties were given power, limited at first, to adopt their own
form of government. This power continued to be broadened, culminating in the
broad charter power granted by section 33 of the Municipal Home Rule Law.
Counties that did not follow the charter route were stymied by "one person-
one vote." They could not change their board of supervisors, for they could
change neither town government nor city charters.
.... Subclause (13) was added primarily to give non-charter counties
statutory authority to apportion its legislative body. The Chairman of the As-
sembly Judiciary Committee, who introduced the bill that enacted subclause
(13), said in the memorandum in support of his bill:
"More important, apart from certain of the larger counties which had
special structures or were adopting or amending their county charters,
there was considerable doubt as to the power of the local governments
to reorganize their legislature absent a judicial decree specifically di-
recting such a change." (Bill jacket, L 1969, ch 834.)
Id.
so Ch. 834, §1, 1969 N.Y. Laws, 1224, 1224.
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C. Westchester's New Legislative Form and Composition
Predictably, in the mid-1960s, Westchester County's super-
visorial form and composition of the county legislature was chal-
lenged on constitutional grounds. The supervisorial form had
survived because the county voters had previously refused to
change the form and composition of the Board of Supervisors in
1941. The litigation generated a litany of ten reported and three
unreported opinions at all levels of the New York State courts. 7
This tortured saga unfolded because the Supreme Court of
Westchester County disapproved of a number of alternate sys-
tems for the composition and form of the county legislature in
which weighted and fractional voting and multi-member dis-
tricts were proposed. Two systems that were finally approved by
the supreme court were subsequently defeated in referenda.08 Fi-
nally, the Westchester Supreme Court itself ordered the switch
in the form and composition of the county legislature. The plan
chosen was very similar to the alternative plan that had been
specifically authorized in the County Charter since 1937 and re-
jected in 1941.69 Forty-two months after the first reported deci-
67 The decisions are all captioned Town of Greenburgh v. Board of Supervisors of
Westchester County, and are reported as follows: 49 Misc. 2d 116, 266 N.Y.S.2d 998
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1966); 51 Misc. 2d 168, 272 N.Y.S.2d 906 (Sup. Ct. West-
chester County 1966); 53 Misc. 2d 88, 277 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County
1967); 55 Misc. 2d 1031, 287 N.Y.S.2d 154 (Sup. Ct. Westchester County 1968); 30
A.D.2d 708, 292 N.Y.S.2d 334 (2d Dep't 1968); 57 Misc. 2d 1008, 293 N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup.
Ct. Westchester County), rev'd, 23 N.Y.2d 732, 244 N.E.2d 63, 296 N.Y.S.2d 373 (1968);
59 Misc. 2d 152, 298 N.Y.S.2d 615 (Sup. CL Westchester County), afPd, 32 A.D.2d 892,
302 N.Y.S.2d 970 (2d Dep't), a)fd, 25 N.Y.2d 817, 250 N.E.2d 719, 303 N.Y.S.2d 673
(1969). Officially unreported decisions of the Westchester Supreme Court were issued on
August 23, 1967, and May 21, 1968, and one additional decision is reported at N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 5, 1969, at 20 (Sup. CL Westchester County 1969).
" Referenda had been held because the county was changing from a legislative sys-
tern of territorial representation by Supervisors to a different form and composition of
the county legislature in which county legislators were directly elected from districts of
approximately the same population. See CouNT ConE, supra note 18, § 209.161. The
referenda could not have been held pursuant to MHRL § 10(1)(a)(13) because that pro-
vision was added to the MHRL after these referenda occurred.
69 While the alternative form and composition contemplated by the County Charter
was a county legislature of ten to twelve members elected from single member districts
of 50,000 persons each, the court found that a seventeen member county legislature
elected from single member districts would be appropriate in light of population growth
since 1937. See Town of Greenburgh, 59 Misc. 2d 152, 155, 298 N.Y.S.2d 615, 619-20
(Sup. Ct. Westchester County), af/d, 32 A.D.2d 892, 302 N.Y.S.2d 970 (2d Dep't), alPd,
25 N.Y.2d 817, 244 N.E.2d 63, 303 N.Y.S.2d 673 (1969); cf. ch. 617, §§ 5, 8, 1937 N.Y.
Laws 1317, 1318, 1320.
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sion, and after all appeals were completed, Westchester County
was finally operating under a judicially ordered system which
changed the form and composition of the county legislature to
that which is in use today.
To memorialize and codify the judicially ordered switch in
the form and composition of the county legislature, the county
legislature enacted Local Law No. 10-1970.70 In so doing, the
county legislature retained its power to redistrict under local law
by using language that was very similar to the original grant of
power from the state legislature. 1
Since the enactment of Local Law No. 10-1970, the county
legislature has continually retained its form and composition. To
this date, the county legislature is composed of seventeen mem-
bers elected from single-member election districts. In 1973, in a
local law that became effective without any delay to allow the
filing of any referendum petition, the county legislature modified
certain election district lines in response to the population data
generated by the 1970 decennial census.7 Similarly, district
boundaries were modified again pursuant to the 1980 decennial
census. 3 It is important to note that both of these redistrictings
share two critical attributes: both were effective immediately
and no referendum followed either local law's enactment.7 4
Finally, in 1991, the county redistricted pursuant to the
1990 decennial census.7 5 As it had after the 1970 and 1980 de-
cennial census, the county sought to implement the new legisla-
tie districts immediately without any referendum.
V. THE Mehiel LITIGATION
A. The Trial Court Ruling
There being no disputed issues of fact and only matters of
law before the court, the Mehiel.case was decided on summary
7' Local Law No. 10-1970 also deleted material from the original text of the County
Charter that had been effectively superseded by the court's decree. See COUNTY CHAR-
TER, supra note 8, § 107.31.
"1 Compare CoulNY CHARTER, supra note 8, § 107.31(6) with Act of May 25, 1937,
ch. 617, § 8(1) & (3), 1937 N.Y. Laws 1317, 1320, 1321.
" See Local Law No. 2-1973.
" See Local Law No. 6-1983.
" See Local Law No. 2-1973; Local Law No. 6-1983.
"' The county redistricting was adopted as Local Law 8-1991.
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judgment by Supreme Court Justice Donovan, Westchester
County."6 Justice Donovan granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and held that the Local Law 8-1991 or any
other redistricting of the county legislature is subject to a
mandatory referendum."
Justice Donovan accepted the plaintiffs' argument that
MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) governed the county's exercise of its
power to redistrict the county legislature.7 In particular, he held
that all local governments have the power to adopt and amend
local laws "relating to their government" so long as they are
"consistent with [the] state constitution and general law. . in-
cluding subparagraph 13 [of MHRL §10(1)(a)]:" '
78 See Mehiel v. County Bd. of Legislators of Westchester, N.Y.L.J., June 27, 1991,
at 28 (Sup. CL Westchester County June 20, 1991).
7 Id. Justice Donovan also held that Local Law 8-1991 would be placed on the bal-
lot at the November 1991 general election and that the 1991 primary and general elec-
tions would be conducted under the existing district lines.
78 Curiously, Justice Donovan reached this conclusion even though he expressly rec-
ognized that MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) was enacted as an addition to other powers of
local governments. Id.
711 Id. Justice Donovan then concluded that the cross reference to MHRL section
24(2)(j) in MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) would have required Westchester County to
allow the county's qualified electors an opportunity to file a petition demanding a refer-
endum on Local Law 8-1991. Id. However, requiring compliance with permissive referen-
dum procedures was unnecessary because Justice Donovan concluded that a mandatory
referendum was required.
Justice Donovan accepted the plaintiffs' argument that MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13)(e) should be linked to section 209.161 of the County Code. As a result, he
ruled that the existence of a County Code provision requiring a mandatory referendum
on a local law purporting to change the form or composition of the county legislature
would cause the mandatory referendum language of IMHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) to be
applicable to Westchester County.
Justice Donovan held:
In determining whether in Westchester County an apportionment or reappor-
tionment plan is subject to mandatory referendum, the Court initially turns to
the County Charter .... Section 107.31 ... provides that the County Board
will, if necessary, after each decennial federal census adopt a local law amend-
ing the districting plan .... The Court next refers to section 209.161 of the
Westchester County Administrative Code [which] provides that no local law
shall be effective unless and until passed by a majority of voters... if such a
law. . . "changes the form or composition of the elective governing body of the
county. . .. "
Returning to MHRL section 10, 1., a., (13) (e.), an apportionment plan is
to be subjected to the permissive referendum procedures of HRL section 24:
"... except that such local law shall be subject to a mandatory referen-
dum in any county in which a provision of law requires a mandatory
referendum if a local law proposes a change in the form or composition
of the elective governing body of the county .... "
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Justice Donovan ruled that MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(f),
which prohibits a local government from "restructuring" its local
legislative body more than once each decade, demonstrated that
the state legislature considered redistricting to be a "restructur-
ing" of the legislative body.80 While Justice Donovan did not ex-
pressly state that redistricting is synonymous with a change in
the form or composition of the legislative body, as a practical
matter he did so by stating that the state legislature intended
to use "restructure" and "redistrict" or "reapportion" inter-
changeably.
Furthermore, Justice Donovan relied upon the following
language in MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(f) for the proposition
that the state legislature intended to preempt the field of local
legislation in the area of reapportionment: "'Notwithstanding
any inconsistent provisions of any general or special law, or any
local law, ordinance, resolution or city or county charter hereto-
fore or hereafter adopted, no local government may restructure
its local legislative body . .. more than once in each decade
" ,81
Even though MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(a)-(e) mentions
nothing about preemption of charter county redistricting, Jus-
tice Donovan found in MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(f) an overall
intent by the state legislature to preempt all aspects of local gov-
ernment redistricting and to require that all redistricting be un-
dertaken in accordance with the requirements of the MHRL. 2
Such a local law, i.e. section 209.161 ... does so require a mandatory referen-
dum regarding a change in form or composition of government and hence, any
apportionment plan sought to be adopted must ... be submitted to a
mandatory referendum. While counsel may have argued much ovei the iden-
tity of meaning of "change in the form or composition" and "apportionment or
reapportionment," the State legislature in section 10 has either equated them
or, in the least, joined them as a common triggering device for mandatory
referendum.
Id. (emphasis omitted and added).
80 Id:
81 Id. (quoting N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(a)(13)(f)) (emphasis omitted).
82 Id. Justice Donovan cited three cases in support of his conclusion that local gov-
ernment redistricting powers had been preempted: Consolidated Edison v. Town of
Redhook, 60 N.Y.2d 99, 456 N.E.2d 487, 468 N.Y.S.2d 596 (1983) (involving state pre-
emption under a local law inconsistent with the Public Service Law in the context of
siting a major steam generating plant); Ames v. Smoot, 98 A.D.2d 216, 471 N.Y.S.2d 128
(2d Dep't 1983) (preemption of local regulation of pesticide use); Davis Constr. Corp. v.
County of Suffolk, 95 A.D.2d 819, 464 N.Y.S.2d 519 (2d Dep't 1983) (preemption of local




B. Issues on Appeal
1. Preemption of Local Government Powers
The doctrine of preemption is a limitation on local govern-
ment home rule powers.8 3 The New York Court of Appeals has
described local government preemption as follows:
The preemption doctrine represents a fundamental limitation on
home rule powers. While localities have been invested with substantial
powers both by affirmative grant and by restriction on State powers in
matters of local concern, the overriding limitation of the preemption
doctrine embodies "the untrammeled primacy of the Legislature to
act ... with respect to matters of State concern." 8
Generally, a local law will be ruled invalid if the state legis-
lature has preempted the entire field and the local law attempts
to regulate in the field, or if the local law is inconsistent with
applicable state general laws. In either case, the state legislature
must intend to prevent local action, although that intent may be
implied from the subject matter regulated, the purpose and
scope of applicable state legislation, or the need for statewide
uniformity.85 In fact such intent must be clear when the legisla-
ture intends to occupy the entire field, 0 particularly when the
power to be preempted involves a matter of local concern such
as local legislative redistricting.87
a. State Legislature Did Not Intend MHRL Section
10(1)(a)(13) to Preempt Local Charters
On appeal, one of the fundamental questions presented for
review, was whether the state legislature intended the MHRL to
volved local government redistricting or local legislati~e form or composition.
" See Wambat Realty Corp. v. State, 41 N.Y.2d 490, 362 N.F12d 581, 393 N.YS.2d
949 (1977); Perales v. Heimbach, 166 A.D.2d 707, 561 N.Y.S.2d 290 (2d Dep't 1990);
Dougal v. County of Suffolk, 102 A.D.2d 531, 477 N.Y.S.2d 381 (2d Dep't 1984), afl'd, 65
N.Y.2d 668, 481 N.E.2d 254, 491 N.Y.S.2d 622 (1985).
Albany Axea Builders Ass'n v. Town of Guilderland, 74 N.Y.2d 372, 377, 546
N.E.2d 920, 922, 547 N.Y.S.2d 627, 629 (1989) (citations omitted).
" Id.
88 See, e.g., Ba Mar, Inc. v. County of Rockland, 164 A.D.2d 605, 566 N.YS.2d 298
(2d Dep't 1991).
87See Baldwin v. City of Buffalo, 6 N.Y.2d 168, 173, 160 N.E.2d 443, 445, 189
N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1959).
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prevail over differing provisions of the County Charter and Code
relating to redistricting. In other words, does a chartered local
government that has been delegated the power in its charter to
redistrict exercise its redistricting powers under the grant in its
charter or under the MHRL?
Westchester County argued that not only did the language
of MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) fail to demonstrate any express or
implied intent of the state legislature to preempt the redistrict-
ing powers granted to the county in its charter, but in addition,
that the actual expressed intent of the state legislature was to
allow the exercise of redistricting powers under local government
charter provisions.
The express language employed by the state legislature in
the session law enacting subparagraph 13 of MHRL section
10(1)(a) unambiguously establishes that section 10(1)(a)(13) was
not enacted to limit local government powers but rather to ex-
pand them and to preserve existing powers of local governments
to redistrict without referenda of any type:
It is recognized that local governments do have some powers of local
legislation respecting restructuring of their legislative bodies and this
act is intended to extend alternative powers to them. To the extent
that local governments already have local legislative powers not sub-
ject to referenda requirements, or subject to less restrictive referenda
requirements, this act is not intended to and does not impose addi-
tional referenda requirements upon them in the exercise of such
powers. 8
Accordingly, the state legislature itself has stated that sub-
paragraph 13 was included in MHRL section 10(1)(a) to provide
additional flexibility and powers to noncharter counties and not
to diminish any existing powers of chartered counties. To ensure
that the statute actually implemented its expressed intent, the
state legislature drafted subparagraph 13 to circumscribe clearly
the applicability of the statute to the "apportionment of [a
county's] legislative body. . taken pursuant to this subpara-
graph."' 9 Only noncharter counties need redistrict pursuant to
" Act of May 22, 1969, ch. 834, §1, 1969 N.Y. Laws 1224, 1225 (amending N.Y. MUN.
HOME RULE LAW § 10) (emphasis added).
89 N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10(1)(a)(13) (emphasis added). The state legislature
reinforced this expression of its intent by beginning each of the relevant sub-subpara-
graphs of MHRL § 10(1)(a)(13) with the same proviso:
(a) A plan of apportionment adopted under this subparagraph ...
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subparagraph 13 of MRHL section 10(1)(a).
Finally, as if all of the prior provisions were not explicit
enough, the state legislature specifically and directly addressed
the interrelationship between subparagraph 13 and other
sources of local power to district: "The power granted by this
subparagraph shall be in addition to and not in substitution for
any other power and the provisions of this subparagraph shall
apply only to local governments which adopt a plan of appor-
tionment thereunder." 90
Thus, the only possible construction of subparagraph 13 is
that the state legislature enacted it to provide additional powers
and authority to those units of local government which needed
such a grant (i.e. noncharter counties), while it preserved other
existing grants of authority and sources of power without modi-
fication. Thus, when a home rule charter county, such as West-
chester, redistricts pursuant to article 9 of the state constitution
as delegated through the County's Code and Charter, the county
may ignore all of the provisions of MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13).
b. MHRL Section 10(1)(a)(13) is Inapplicable to Local
Government Units That Redistrict Under a Separate Grant
of Power
While the trial court's decision relied upon general prece-
dents in the area of local government preemption, precedents
specifically analyzing MHRL section 10(1) (a) (13) were consis-
tent with Westchester County's analysis of the statute. For ex-
ample, in Calandra v. City of New York 1 the city of New York
redistricted its city council once in 1971 and again in 1974. The
second change to the districts was challenged on the ground that
MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(f) prohibited more than one redis-
tricting per decade. Justice Alexander, 2 in analyzing the powers
(b) A plan of apportionment adopted by a county under this subparagraph
(d) Where a public hearing on a local law proposed to be adopted under this
subparagraph is required...
(e) A local law proposed to be adopted under this subparagraph shall be sub-
ject to referendum ....
Id. (emphasis added).
90 Id.
:1 90 Misc. 2d 487, 395 N.Y.S.2d 995 (Sup. CL N.Y. County 1977).
92 Judge Alexander has since recently resigned from the N.Y. Court of Appeals.
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of the city to redistrict, concluded that the city had authority
and power to redistrict independent of MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13). Justice Alexander concluded that MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13) was intended to provide alternative supplemental
powers and not to supersede existing grants of redistricting
power: "The legislature intended that chapter 834 would extend
alternative powers to those already possessed by local govern-
ments and declared that Chapter 834 was not intended to, nor
did it impose additional referenda or more restrictive require-
ments upon local legislative powers not then subject to refer-
enda requirements."' 3
Not only does the statutory language of MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13) fail to demonstrate any intent of the state legisla-
ture to preempt charter counties' districting powers, but, to the
contrary, the language is such a strong statement of the state
legislature's desire to leave chartered local governments' district-
ing powers intact and unaffected, that MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13) was held totally inapplicable to chartered local gov-
ernments in Calandra:
An examination of the legislative history out of which [County] Char-
ter Sec. 22 g emerged and a comparison of that history with the mani-
fested legislative intent underlying the enactment of Municipal Home
Rule Law section 10(1)(a)(13)(f), satisfies this Court that the provi-
sions of the two statutes are not in conflict and that the cited section
of the Home Rule Law has no application to the circumstances at
bar.""
Indeed, Calandra supports the conclusion that the referen-
dum requirements of MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) are equally
inapplicable to local governments districting pursuant to their
charter. e9
" Calandra, 90 Misc. 2d at 493, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 999 (emphasis added).
Id. at 490-91, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 997-98 (emphasis added).
Justice Alexander stated:
The Court finds therefore that the enactment by the City Council of Local Law
23 pursuant to the mandate of chapter 634 of the Laws of 1972 is not in viola-
tion of Municipal Home Rule Law Sec. 10(1)(a)(13)(f) and indeed was accom-
plished through a power and procedure authorized by the Legislature to exist
in addition to and not subject to the limitations of the powers conferred by
Chapter 834 of the Laws of 1969.
Indeed, it is clear that the restructuring of the City Council accomplished
pursuant to the mandate of chapter 1206 of the Laws of 1971 was done pursu-
ant to a power expressly conferred by the legislature, in addition to and not
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The clear import of Justice Alexander's analysis of MHRL
section 10(1)(a)(13)-an analysis equally applicable to the
Mehiel litigation-is that preemption is not only entirely with-
out foundation, but that the entire legislative scheme codified in
MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) is of absolutely no relevance to a
chartered local government redistricting under express authority
granted by the state legislature."6
c. Appellate Division Adopts Westchester County's
Position
When the matter finally came to the appellate division for
decision in Mehiel, the Second Department unanimously re-
versed the trial court and held as follows:
We find that the Supreme Court's reliance on Municipal Home Rule
Law §10(1)(a)(13)(a) is misplaced. Westchester County operates
under a charter form of government and its reapportionment plans
are adopted pursuant to its charter, not Municipal Home Rule Law
§10(1)(a)(13)(a). Since the County Board of Legislators did not adopt
a plan of apportionment pursuant to Municipal Home Rule Law
§10(1)(a)(13)(a), it is not controlling here."
In essence, the appellate division firmly rejected any notion
that MHRL section 10(1) (a) (13) was enacted to limit the powers
of charter counties which redistrict pursuant to a delegation of
redistricting power in their own charters. The appellate division
equally definitively reaffirmed that a charter county redistricts
pursuant to the delegation of power in its charter and not pursu-
ant to the redistricting powers conferred in A-RL section
10(1)(a)(13). 98
subject to the limitations of Chapter 834 of the Laws of 1969. It is noted that
this expansion and redistricting (apportionment, if you will) of the City
Council was done without regard to the referendum on petition requirements
of Municipal Home Rule Law Section 24(2)(j) although those requirements
existed at the time Local Laws 4 and 53 of 1973 were enacted by the City
Council.
Id. at 494, 395 N.Y.S.2d at 999-1000 (emphasis added).
" In accord with Calandra, see 1979 Op. N.Y. Att'y Gen. 110; 1981 Op. N.Y. Att'y
Gen. 255 (Informal).
11 Mehiel, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 808 (citations omitted).
18 As the appellate division ruled that a county which has been delegated redistrict-
ing powers in its charter does not redistrict pursuant to M1HRL section 10(1)(a)(13), the
appellate division did not reach the question of whether the County's home rule charter
provisions could supersede inconsistent provisions of IMfHRL section 10(1)(o)(13), should
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As the appellate division rejected any preemption of local
government charter-based redistricting powers, the only way
that Westchester County could be subject to a referendum re-
quirement in connection with its redistricting is if redistricting
is equivalent to a change in the form or composition of the
county legislature.
2. Form or Composition of a Local Elected Legislative
Body
To understand what comprises a change in the "form or
composition" of the county legislature, and what does not, it is
helpful to focus once again on the history of local government in
New York during the last half-century. The typical supervisorial
system of organizing county legislatures possessed the following
attributes:
1. supervisors were town and city elected officials who also
served on the county board of supervisors by virtue of their
holding a municipal elected office;
2. supervisors represented territorial units of the county,
that is its towns and the wards in its cities;
that provision of the MHRL have been held applicable to the County. In fact, strong
authority exists to support such a supersession argument.
There is no doubt that the County Charter and Code are special state statutes and
MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) is a general law. The following rule of construction applies
when special and general statutes conflict:
A special statute which is in conflict with a general act covering the same sub-
ject matter controls the case and repeals the general statute insofar as the spe-
cial act applies' (McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 1, Statutes, § 397) at
least where no contrary intention is clearly indicated.
208 East 30th St. Corp. v. Town of North Salem, 88 A.D.2d 281, 283, 452 N.Y.S.2d 902,
905 (2d Dep't 1982) (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Bloom v. Town Bd.
of Yorktown, 80 A.D.2d 823, 436 N.Y.S.2d 355 (2d Dep't 1981).
In Bloom and North Salem the Westchester County Code was held to supersede
conflicting provisions of the General Municipal Law. Similarly, a provision of the Nassau
County Administrative Code relating to service of process and enacted as a state special
law was held to supersede an inconsistent provision of CPLR § 3211. See Horowitz v.
Incorporated Village of Roslyn, 144 A.D.2d 639, 535 N.Y.S.2d 79 ,(2d Dep't 1988). See
also Grayson v. Town of Huntington, 144 Misc. 2d 1064, 545 N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct.
Suffolk County 1989).
As the County Code and Charter are both special laws enacted by the state legisla-
ture, under Bloom and North Salem, they both should supersede the general MHRL to
the extent that the MHRL is inconsistent with the County's Code and Charter. Thus,
even had the appellate division found MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) applicable to the
County, for the reasons stated above, the provisions of MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)
should have been held to have been superseded by the County's Code and Charter.
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3. counties determined the total number of supervisors on
the county board and the number of supervisors to be elected
from each territorial unit of the county;
4. if a city was represented by more than one supervisor on
the county board, then the city established the division of its
territory into wards for purposes of electing supervisors to serve
on the county board.
Following the voting rights lawsuits of the 1960s, the follow-
ing form and composition of the county legislature was typically
adopted:
1. legislators were elected directly to the county board;
2. legislators represented districts of the county which were
designed to be relatively equal in population;
3. the county board determined the division of the county
into election districts;
4. the number of county legislators changed as population
increased.
Such alterations accomplished a change in the form and
composition of the county legislature without changing the
county's form of government. In other words, the representa-
tional system, organization, number, and method of electing
county legislators changed, but the legislature's powers and its
relation to the other branches of the county government did not.
But, while a change in the form and composition of the county
legislature is less than an entire change in the form of county
government, it nonetheless involves a significant change in the
county legislature's structural system of organization and
representation.
By contrast, a change in ward or district boundaries, as was
enacted by Local Law 8-1991, does not change any attributes of
the legislative body's form or composition. The same number of
elected county legislators are still in the county legislature, the
county is still divided into the same number of districts, the
manner of electing the county legislators has not changed, and
the predicate for representation is unchanged (representing peo-
ple, not territory). All that garden-variety redistricting accom-
plishes is a decennial adjustment to the boundary lines of the
local government's legislative districts, to assure that the ex-
isting form and composition of the county legislature does not
violate the proscription of one person, one vote or any other rel-
evant constitutional or statutory standards.
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When a county changes from a supervisorial system to a
system of directly elected legislators representing districts of
substantially equal population, establishing district lines is part
of the overall change in the form and composition of the legisla-
tive body. However, when no such change to the form or compo-
sition occurs, and the purpose for redistricting is merely to shift
district boundaries to account for demographic changes identi-
fied in the decennial census, then such redistricting is not, as a
matter of law, a change in the form or composition of the local
elected legislative body.99
This is not a novel idea. Indeed, there is a line of authority
stretching back at least half-a-century which has repeatedly held
that, in effect, redrawing election district lines is merely a rou-
tine task which local governments may perform free of referen-
dum requirements. 100
In Lane v. Johnson °10 the New York Court of Appeals held
that even increasing the number of supervisors was not a change
in the form or composition of the elective governing body of the
county. In Baldwin v. City of Buffalo 02 the court of appeals ob-
served that the mere changing of ward boundaries did not re-
quire a mandatory referendum. In Neils v. City of Yonkers 10 3
the Supreme Court of Westchester County held that "[tihe
1, It must be remembered, however, that "substantive" attacks on redistricting are
unaffected by Mehiel-like "procedural" decisions. Challenges to newly drawn legislative
district lines can still be made on state and federal equal protection grounds, for alleged
violations of the constitutional "one person, one vote" requirement and of the statutory
Voting Rkights Act antidiscrimination guarantee. See notes 6-8, 12 and accompanying
text supra.
100 The principal authorities relied on by the plaintiffs in Mehiel are distinguisha-
ble. Graham v. Supervisors of Erie County, 25 A.D.2d 250, 269 N.Y.S.2d 477 (4th Dep't
1966), and Trieber v. Lanigan, 25 A.D.2d 202, 269 N.Y.S.2d 595 (4th Dep't 1966), in-
volved a typical change in the composition and form of the County Board after the tradi-
tional Board of Supervisors election system was struck down. In Village of North Syra-
cuse v. County Legislature of Onondaga, 74 Misc. 2d 824, 346 N.Y.S.2d 439 (Sup. Ct.
Onondaga County 1973), the court ordered a referendum after reapportionment without
any analysis of whether a referendum was in fact required. Rather, the court merely
assumed that a referendum could occur, relying upon Prentiss v. Cahill, 73 Misc. 2d 245,
341 N.Y.S.2d 741 (Sup. Ct. Albany County 1973), in which the court also had merely
assumed that a referendum was appropriate. In Pll of the cases in which the issue was
truly analyzed, briefed and aggressively argued, the result was that a mere change in
district boundary lines does not change the "form or composition" of the elected legisla-
tive body.
"1 283 N.Y. 244 (1940).
:02 6 N.Y.2d 168, 160 N.E.2d 443, 189 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1959).
203 38 Misc. 2d 691, 237 N.Y.S.2d 245 (1962).
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changing of ward boundary lines . . . does not constitute a
change in the form or composition of the local legislative
body. ' 10 4 In Dobish v. State05 the adoption of a weighted voting
plan for county board of supervisors was held not to require a
referendum, mandatory or otherwise.
When the matter reached the appellate division in Mehiel,
the court again ruled definitively. Relying on Baldwin and Neils
the Second Department held:
The redistricting plan under consideration merely changes the bound-
ary lines of the legislative districts in Westchester County and does
not constitute a change in the "form or composition" of the Westches-
ter County Legislature. Accordingly, Municipal Home Rule Law §
34(4) and Westchester County Administrative Code § 209.161 do not
require a referendum under the circumstances herein.10
In this ruling, the appellate division clearly rejected the
plaintiffs' attempt to equate simple redistricting with a change
in the form or composition of a local elected legislative body.
CONCLUSION
The Mehiel case has answered many questions on the power
of local governments to redistrict. First, units of local govern-
ment that are redistricting under a grant of power separate and
apart from MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) are not governed by that
subparagraph unless they affirmatively choose to redistrict pur-
suant to it. In other words, MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) is availa-
ble as a supplemental source of redistricting power, but any unit
of local government that possesses a separate grant of power
may redistrict under such a separate grant and thereby avoid
the requirements and limitations of this provision of the MHRL.
Such a separate grant of power may be contained in a local char-
ter, whether the charter is adopted locally under the County
Charter Law or some other enabling legislation, or is enacted by
the state as special legislation.
To the extent that a county redistricts under a grant of au-
thority contained in its charter, it is bound by New York Consti-
tution, article 9, section 1(h)(2), and section 34(4) of the MHRL
104 Id. at 696, 237 N.Y.S.2d at 251 (emphasis added).
54 Misc. 2d 367, 282 N.Y.S.2d 791 (Sup. Ct. Wayne County 1967).
106 Mehiel, 571 N.Y.S.2d at 809 (citations omitted).
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and will be required to comply with permissive referendum pro-
visions contained therein, only if the county redistricts as part
of a change in the local legislative body's form or composition.
However, mere redistricting alone does not trigger such referen-
dum requirements because the simple act of locally adjusting
legislative district boundary lines is not a change in the form or
composition of the local elected legislative body.
To the extent that a county or other unit of local govern-
ment redistricts under MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13), either be-
cause it has no other grant of redistricting power or because it
chooses to do so, such a redistricting will be subject to the per-
missive referendum provisions of MHRL section 24(2)(j) as pro-
vided in MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e). The permissive referen-
dum process will be applicable to all redistricting undertaken
under MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13). However, if the redistricting
is undertaken under MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) and is also part
of a change in the form or composition of the local elected legis-
lative body, then a mandatory referendum will occur on the re-
districting local law if another provision of law mandates a refer-
endum on a change in local legislative form or composition.
Interestingly, there is no general law provision subjecting a
change in the form or composition of a county elected legislative
body to a mandatory referendum. At most, a permissive referen-
dum is required, per New York Constitution, article 9, section
1(h)(2) and MHRL section 34(4).
As the courts in Calandra and Mehiel both concluded that
MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13) is wholly inapplicable to units of lo-
cal government that district under an independent grant of
power, it is clear that all of the provisions of MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13) are inapplicable to chartered units of local govern-
ment, such as Westchester, which district per a grant of power
in their charter. Thus, not only are the referendum requirements
of MHRL section 10(1)(a)(13)(e) inapplicable to such chartered
units of local government, but the substantive limits of subdivi-
sion (a) of this provision and the prohibition against districting
more than once every ten years in subdivision (f) are equally in-
applicable to units of local government that redistrict under a
separate grant of power, such as Westchester County.
Finally, as it is clear that redistricting under MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13) can subject a unit of local government to far greater
substantive and procedural restrictions than might otherwise be
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the case when redistricting under a local charter or other grant
of power, a wise precaution in all redistricting local laws would
be an express statement noting that the local government has
enacted its redistricting local law under the particular grant of
authority in its charter or elsewhere outside MHRL section
10(1)(a)(13), assuming such grant of power exists.
These then are the important lessons of Mehiel. But, most
significantly, the case explicitly answers the fundamental state
constitutional question that mere redistricting, in and of itself, is
not such a fundamental reworking of county government as to
trigger permissive referendum guarantees of the state constitu-
tion. As a charter county or other unit of local government can
redistrict pursuant to its charter, the power to redistrict reposes
with the popularly elected political branches of the local govern-
ment unless the charter affirmatively vests the redistricting
power with the people by providing for a permissive or
mandatory referendum.
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